Who Uses Free Trade Agreements? by Kazunobu HAYAKAWA et al.
     ERIA-DP-2009-22 
 
 









Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization, Japan 
Daisuke HIRATSUKA 
Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization, Japan 
Kohei SHIINO 
Overseas Research Department, Japan External Trade Organization, Japan 
Seiya SUKEGAWA 










Abstract:  It is noted that utilization of ASEAN Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) is low by 
international standards.  In order to clarify the reasons for such low utilization, this paper 
investigates what kinds of Japanese affiliates in ASEAN are more likely to use FTAs in their 
exporting, by employing unique affiliate-level data.  Our findings are as follows.  First, the larger 
the affiliate is, or the more diversified the origins of its procurements, the more likely it is to 
utilize an FTA scheme in its exporting.  Second, affiliates that export actively to countries with 
higher general tariffs are more likely to use FTAs. Third, there are clear differences in FTA 
utilization depending affiliates’ locations and sectors. 
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1.   Introduction 
 
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) have proliferated in East Asia.  Currently, there are 
more than thirty Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) in force involving East Asia, of 
which fourteen are intra-regional.  Regionalism in East Asia has been led by ASEAN in 
particular; the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) is an agreement that will eliminate 
import duties on all products placed in the normal track in the ASEAN-6 (Brunei, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand).  The new member 
countries, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam, will also eliminate tariffs in the 
normal track by 2015.  Furthermore, regionalism in the ASEAN+6 regions is 
exacerbating the hub-and-spoke FTA structure with ASEAN as the hub and other East 
Asian countries as the spokes.
1 
However, such proliferation does not automatically increase the number of 
international transactions that utilize FTA schemes.  In reality, all firms do not necessarily 
use an FTA scheme in their exporting or importing.  Administrative costs for securing 
certificates of origin (COO), which certify that the exported goods were locally produced, 
play a key role in firms’ choice to use FTAs.  In order to secure the COO for the goods 
they export, firms must prepare all documents required by the investigating authorities. 
Since such document preparation is counted as fixed costs, only firms that earn operating 
profits enough to cover the fixed costs will choose to use an FTA scheme.  In East Asia, 
the optional criterion or change in tariff classification criterion tend to be adopted as 
criteria to determine the origin of goods, the so-called rules of origin (ROO).
2  The 
                                                 
1  In this paper, FTA, RTA, and Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) are used interchangeably. 
2  There are four main types of criteria to determine the origin of goods: 1) the value-added content 
criterion, 2) the change in tariff classification criterion, 3) the optional criterion that allows firms a   2
“third-party certificate system” is often adopted as a procedure to certify origin; this is a 
system wherein third parties such as a relevant ministry or a chamber of commerce take a 
role in issuing a certificate of origin after reviewing applications filed by firms.
3  In East 
Asia, such ROO and procedures to certify origin result in a certain amount of fixed costs 
for FTA use, discouraging firms from utilizing an FTA scheme. 
Particularly in East Asia, it is noted that the rate of FTA utilization remains at a fairly 
low level.  Hiratsuka et al. (2008) point out that, to begin with, Japanese firms and their 
affiliates operating in ASEAN are not well aware of FTAs.  The utilization of AFTA 
measured by the ratio of AFTA administrative records to total exports was low, at around 
15% to 20%, during the period 2003-06.  The utilization rate on the import side was 
around 11% to 16%, lower than the corresponding rate for the export side.  Furthermore, 
the utilization of AFTA observed for both exports and imports is low by international 
standards.  Kohpaiboon (2008) pointed out that the AFTA utilization rates were lower 
than those of NAFTA; the NAFTA utilization rate by Mexican exports to the United 
States was around 60% in 2004-05.  The utilization rate by Chilean exports to the United 
States was around 55% in 2005-06 (James, 2006).  
Against this backdrop, the aim of this paper is to clarify the reasons for the low rate of 
FTA utilization in East Asia by investigating what kinds of Japanese affiliates in ASEAN 
are more likely to use FTAs in their exporting.  Indeed, such firm characteristics have 
potentially important policy implication, but they remain almost unknown.  From the 
theoretical point of view, we can refer to one important paper, Demidova and Krishna 
                                                                                                                                               
choice of whether to use the value-added content criterion or the change in tariff classification 
criterion, and 4) the dual criterion which requires firms to use both the value-added content criterion 
and the change in tariff classification criterion.  For details of each criterion, see the WTO website. 
3  There are three main procedures to certify the origin of goods: 1) the third-party certificate system, 
2) the self-certificate system, and 3) a hybrid system of third-party certification and self-certification. 




(2008).  Introducing firm heterogeneity as in Melitz (2003), they demonstrate that 
productive firms use an FTA scheme in their exporting, while the less productive firms 
use general tariff rates because the less productive firms cannot afford to pay document 
fixed costs for FTA use.  Thus, firms’ productivity can be taken as one important firms’ 
attribute.  Also on the empirical side, there are few previous studies investigating such 
firms’ attributes, perhaps due to the limited data.
4  Nevertheless, there are three important 
trial papers.  Kohpaiboon (2008) analyzed AFTA implementation by Thai exporters for 
the period 2003-06, by using AFTA administrative records (collected by the Bureau of 
Preferential Trade, Department of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce).  He found that 
large conglomerate firms or firms in industries with a huge margin between general and 
preferential tariff rates tend to utilize the AFTA scheme.  If we take firms’ scale as a proxy 
for their productivity, the former result supports the above-mentioned theoretical 
proposition in Demidova and Krishna (2008) at the sector level.  On the other hand, 
Takahashi and Urata (2008, 2009) examine FTA usage by Japanese firms at the firm level 
by employing a questionnaire survey.  They found that larger firms are more likely to use 
FTA schemes.  Thus, the positive relationship between a firm’s productivity and its FTA 
use is valid also at the firm level. 
In this paper, we employ a unique dataset.  The Japan External Trade Organization 
(JETRO) has carried out an ongoing survey of Japanese affiliates operating in Asia for 22 
years, since 1987.  The survey was initially targeted at manufacturing companies, but in 
the wake of the growth of the service sector, inclusion of non-manufacturing companies 
began in 2007 (the 21st survey).  The survey, named the “Survey of Japanese-Affiliated 
Firms in ASEAN, India, and Oceania,” has included questions on the affiliates’ FTA use 
                                                 
4  The impact of FTA on trade is often evaluated by estimating the well-known gravity equation.  See, 
for example, Endoh (1999) and Baier and Bergstrand (2007).   4
particularly in the last three years.  For example, it asks whether or not the affiliate 
currently uses any existing bilateral/multilateral FTAs or EPAs for import or export 
activities.  In the survey, moreover, the basic information on affiliates’ activities, such as 
the breakdown of their export destinations and their procurement sources, is also 
collected.  Therefore, this survey enables us to explore more firm characteristics 
including their scale.  In addition, using the detailed firm characteristics, we can examine 
firms’ choice of FTA use with the more sophisticated sample.  For example, it is possible 
to restrict the sample to firms which are actually exporting to FTA partner countries.  
Such detailed and sophisticated analyses will contribute to the enhancement of our 
understanding of the mechanics of firms’ FTA use. 
The organization of this paper is as follows.  Section 2 introduces our dataset and 
presents an overview of Japanese affiliates’ FTA use in Asia.  In Section 3, we present our 
hypotheses on the relationship between firms’ characteristics and their FTA use.  Our 
empirical framework for examining such hypotheses is presented in Section 4.  The 
empirical results are reported in Section 5, and our conclusion is presented in Section 6. 
 
 
2.   The Utilization of FTAs by Japanese Affiliates 
 
Employing the 22
nd JETRO survey, this section introduces the usage of FTAs by 
Japanese affiliates.  The survey, which was sent to 5,107 Japanese affiliates operating in 
thirteen countries, received 1,852 valid responses (36.3%).  Of these, 1,354 were from 
ASEAN7 countries (Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, 




263 from Oceania (Australia and New Zealand).  Although our main analysis presented in 
the following sections is devoted to the usage of FTAs for exporting in ASEAN, this 
section also refers, for the sake of completeness, to the usage of FTAs for importing in 
ASEAN.  In order to ensure sufficient responses in each ASEAN country, we focus on six 
ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and 
Vietnam). 
Table 1 reports Japanese affiliates’ usage rates of FTAs in their exporting and 
importing by their location.  Here we restrict our sample to Japanese affiliates that are 
actually exporting to or importing from any countries.  From this table, we can see that 
22% of Japanese affiliates with export operations in ASEAN take advantage of FTAs. 
This ratio is much lower than 60% in Mexican exports to the United States and 55% in 
Chilean exports to the United States.  Taking a closer look at FTA usage by location in 
ASEAN, the highest level of FTA usage is in Singapore (35%), followed by Indonesia 
(26%), and Malaysia (25%).  In contrast, in the Philippines and Vietnam, the ratio is 
around 10%.  Turning to imports, 18% of Japanese affiliates with import operations in 
ASEAN utilize FTAs for imports, slightly less than the 22% for exports.  In sum, the FTA 
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Table 1.  Utilization of FTAs 
      Exporter     Importer 
Use Intend  No  intention  Use Intend  No  intention 
         to use  to use        to use  to use 
ASEAN  22% 28%  50%  18% 27%  55% 
Indonesia  26% 35%  39%  24% 37%  39% 
Malaysia  25% 21%  53%  16% 18%  66% 
Philippines  15% 23%  61%  10% 20%  70% 
Singapore 35%  22%  44% 
Thailand  22% 34%  44%  21% 33%  46% 
 Vietnam  9%  28%  62%     14%  28%  59% 
Source:  Survey of Japanese-Affiliated Firms in ASEAN, India, and Oceania. 
Note:  “Use” refers to the share of affiliates that are already using FTAs, “Intend to use” to the share of 
affiliates that are now not using but are considering the use of FTAs, and “No intention to use” 
to the share of affiliates that are now not using and are not going to use FTAs.  The figures in 
Singaporean imports are not available since the general tariff rates are already zero or quite low 
in Singapore. 
 
The JETRO survey also asks firms about their reasons for not utilizing FTAs/EPAs. 
The leading reason in the case of exporting is that “importers are exempted from tariffs” 
(123 firms, 37.6%).  Actually in many ASEAN countries, incentives to promote inbound 
investment reduce or eliminate tariffs on materials or parts imported for assembly and 
exported as finished products.  Thus, if firms export to countries with such incentives, 
they do not need to make use of FTAs/EPAs in their exporting.  The second reason is that 
“there are no FTAs/EPAs with the countries to which we export” (75 firms, 22.9%).
5  On 
the other hand, the leading reason why FTAs are neither employed nor considered in 
importing is that investment incentive schemes have already eliminated tariffs, as in the 
case of exporting (157 firms, 48.9%).  Other reasons mentioned include “low levies on 
products sold domestically” (13.4%) and “no FTAs/EPAs with the countries from which 
we import” (13.1%). 
                                                 
5  The third reason is that “tariffs are already low in the countries to which we export” (65 firms, 
19.9%).  Indeed, of the 390 manufacturing firms in Asia and Oceania, the largest proportion (28.2%) 
state that they would consider using an FTA with a preferential tariff margin in the 3% to 5% range 




As a result, the low utilization ratio of Japanese affiliates in ASEAN relates partly to 
their trading with partner countries that do not conclude FTAs with the host countries and 
partly to the existence of investment incentive schemes.  One may say that the non-FTA 
using affiliates in the former case should be eliminated from our sample in calculating 
FTA utilization ratios.  The results excluding such affiliates are reported in Table 2.  We 
can see that FTA utilization ratios rise slightly in most of the countries.  For example, in 
ASEAN, those ratios increase from 22% to 27% in exporting and from 18% to 23% in 
importing.  In addition, it might be valuable to calculate FTA utilization ratios after 
eliminating affiliates not only in the former case but also in the latter case.  Such 
utilization ratios are reported in Table 3.  Compared with Table 2, all countries experience 
a slight rise in FTA utilization ratios, which in ASEAN turn out to be 33% in exporting 
and 31% in importing.  However, we can still say that FTA utilization in ASEAN is much 
lower than that in other regions, as mentioned in the introductory section. 
 
Table 2.  Modified Utilization of FTAs 
      Exporter     Importer 
Use  Intend  No intention  Use  Intend  No intention 
         to use  to use        to use  to use 
ASEAN  27%  27% 46%  23%  27% 50% 
Indonesia  43%  22% 35%  33%  34% 33% 
Malaysia  26%  19% 55%  20%  21% 59% 
Philippines 14%  29% 57%  8%  21% 71% 
Singapore 46%  17%  37% 
Thailand  26%  31% 43%  28%  29% 43% 
  Vietnam  12%  35% 53%  14%  28% 58% 
Source:  Survey of Japanese-Affiliated Firms in ASEAN, India, and Oceania. 
Notes:  In this table, we exclude affiliates trading to countries without any FTAs with the host country. 
“Use” refers to the share of affiliates that are already using FTAs, “Intend to use” to the share of 
affiliates that are now not using but are considering the use of FTAs, and “No intention to use” 
to the share of affiliates that are now not using and are not going to use FTAs.  The figures in 
Singaporean imports are not available since the general tariff rates are already zero or quite low 
in Singapore.   8
Table 3.  Further Modified Utilization of FTAs 
      Exporter     Importer 
Use  Intend  No intention  Use  Intend  No intention 
         to use  to use        to use  to use 
ASEAN 33%  33%  33%  31%  37%  32% 
Indonesia 50%  26%  24%  38%  39%  24% 
Malaysia 38%  28%  34%  28%  29%  43% 
Philippines 18%  36% 45%  15%  39% 46% 
Singapore 54%  20%  26% 
Thailand 31%  36%  33%  37%  39%  24% 
 Vietnam  16%  46%  38%     23%  46%  31% 
Source:  Survey of Japanese-Affiliated Firms in ASEAN, India, and Oceania. 
Notes:  In this table, we further exclude importers enjoying investment incentive schemes or exporters 
of which trading partners enjoy such schemes. “Use” refers to the share of affiliates that are 
already using FTAs, “Intend to use” to the share of affiliates that are now not using but are 
considering the use of FTAs, and “No intention to use” to the share of affiliates that are now not 
using and are not going to use FTAs.  The figures in Singaporean imports are not available 
since the general tariff rates are already zero or quite low in Singapore. 
 
 
3.    Hypotheses 
 
This section presents our hypotheses, which are empirically tested in the following 
sections, on what kinds of firms use an FTA scheme in their exporting.  For firms to use 
an FTA in exporting, the total profit (= operating profit minus fixed costs) from using the 
FTA must be greater than that from not using it.  If firms choose to use an FTA scheme, 
then they can export their products with the FTA preferential tariff rates, which are 
mostly zero percent.  Otherwise, they must pay the general tariff rates, which are mostly 
most-favored nation rates (MFN rates).  Use of the FTA scheme, however, will incur a 
certain level of administrative cost as mentioned in the introductory section, which 




necessary that the difference in the operating profit using FTA rates and operating profit 
using general tariff rates is greater than the fixed costs of FTA use.  
This argument leads immediately to that the larger the difference between FTA rates 
and general tariff rates, the larger the difference in the operating profits from using them. 
Since the FTA preferential rates are mostly zero, it might be simply said that the higher 
the general tariff rates, the larger the difference in the operating profit.  As a result, we 
have the following testable hypothesis: 
 
  Hypothesis 1.  Firms that export to countries with lower general tariff rates are less 
likely to use FTAs. 
The empirical validity of this hypothesis is just confirmed by Kohpaiboon (2008) at 
the sector level. 
On the other hand, even if the tariff margin between them is not so large, the larger 
the volume of exports, the larger the difference in the operating profit per se would be. 
This implies that any elements affecting a firm’s volume of exports and thus its volume of 
outputs are also important.  For example, since lower wages lead to larger outputs, firms 
in countries with low wages can obtain a greater difference in the operating profit 
between two tariff rates and are likely to cover fixed costs for FTA use.  Particularly in 
this paper, we examine the following two firm specific elements. 
The first one is firms’ productivity.  As mentioned in Section 1, it is expected that the 
more productive firms are more likely to use FTAs in their exporting (Demidova and 
Krishna, 2008).  Also in our context, since a firm’s outputs are increasing in proportion to 
its productivity, the difference in the operating profit between FTA rates and general 
tariff rates is positively related to the firm’s productivity.  Therefore, firms with higher   10
productivity can afford to pay administrative costs and are thus more likely to use an FTA 
scheme.  As a result, the testable hypothesis on productivity can be summarized as: 
 
  Hypothesis 2.  The more productive firms are more likely to use FTAs in their 
exporting. 
The second element sheds light on a firm’s diversity in its sources of procurements. 
The hypothesis is summarized as: 
 
  Hypothesis 3.  The more diversified the origins of firms’ procurements are, the more 
likely the firms are to use FTAs in their exporting. 
This is the well-known love-of-variety nature in the procurement of intermediate 
products.  Suppose that intermediate products are differentiated, and further, that firms 
prefer more varieties of intermediate products, as in the usual new trade theory; the more 
diversified origins of firms’ procurements lowers their input costs, resulting in a larger 
volume of output.  In addition to this benefit from the horizontal nature of procurement, 
its diversified origins may yield benefits from vertical division of labor, i.e., international 
fragmentation.
6  That is, input costs are lowered by sourcing each intermediate product 
from a country with location advantages in producing it.  In sum, the more diversified the 
origins of firms’ procurements are, the larger their outputs/exports are, and thus the larger 
the difference in the operating profit between FTA rates and general rates.  
However, more diversified origins might substantially raise the administrative costs 
for FTA use.  In certifying that the exported goods were locally produced, exporters must 
prepare a list of materials inputted for producing them.  To complete the list, exporters 
                                                 
6  For a theoretical analysis of international fragmentation, see Arndt and Kierzkowski (2001).  For an 




need to request each materials supplier to issue an invoice or contract documents.  Thus, 
higher document preparation costs are obviously entailed in sourcing materials from a 
larger number of suppliers.  In other words, more highly diversified origins of 
procurements lead to larger fixed costs for FTA use.  As a result, if the effect of increase 
of the difference in the operating profit between two tariffs is greater than the effect of a 
rise of fixed costs, a firm’s diversity in the sources of procurement encourages it to utilize 
an FTA scheme.  In the sense that the diversity of procurement origins has conflicting 
effects on firm’s choice of FTA use, its empirical examination becomes important. 
 
 
4.   Empirical Framework 
 
This section explains the methodology used to investigate the three hypotheses 
presented in the previous section.  The source of our data for estimation, as noted in 
Section 2, is the “Survey of Japanese-Affiliated Firms in ASEAN, India, and Oceania” for 
2006, 2007, and 2008.  We again focus on Japanese affiliates in six ASEAN countries 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam).  We restrict 
our sample only to exporting affiliates because affiliates are unable to use FTA if they do 
not export.
7  
For our empirical analysis, we specify our index function as: 
Γi = xi’β0 + εi, where εi ~ N(0, 1) and xi = (Exporti, Scalei, Variancei). 
Γi is the difference in affiliate i’s total profits when comparing cases of FTA use and 
                                                 
7  We also conduct some data cleaning.  For example, we eliminate observations in which the sum of 
export shares plus the share of the supply to the local market exceeds 100%.   12


















where yj is an indicator variable taking unity if affiliate j uses an FTA scheme in exporting 
and zero otherwise.  As a result, our probability model by the probit is given by: 
Pr (yi =1| xi) = Φ (xi’β), 
where Φ(•) is the standard cumulative normal probability distribution.  From our sample, 
we exclude the affiliates that answered “considering use” for the data item of FTA use in 
exporting because of their ambiguous standpoint in the choice of FTA use. 
We introduce three kinds of affiliate characteristic variables.  First, we examine the 
impact of the margin between FTA and general tariff rates in the countries to which 
affiliates export their products (Hypothesis 1).  To this end, three kinds of FTAs in which 
a significant number of ASEAN countries are included as members are taken into 
consideration: AFTA, ASEAN-China FTA, and bilateral FTAs with Japan.  Specifically, 
we introduce an Export vector, of which the elements are an export share to the other 
ASEAN countries (ExASEAN), that to China (ExCHINA), and that to Japan (ExJAPAN), 
in total sales.  All other things being equal, as argued in the previous section, the larger 
exports to any countries with FTAs with host countries always increase the difference in 
the operating profit between FTA and general tariff rates.  Thus, three share variables are 
expected to be significantly positive.  However, the magnitude of the coefficients would 
differ according to differences in general tariff rates among ASEAN, China, and Japan. 
For example, since general tariff rates are already low in Japan and still high in China, 




exporting to China.  As a result, the magnitude of the coefficients in descending order is 
expected to be ExCHINA, ExASEAN, and ExJAPAN. 
Second, we examine Hypothesis 2 by introducing Scalei, which is a log of total 
employment.  Our dataset does not have any convincing productivity measures, e.g., 
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) or labor productivity.  From the theoretical point of view, 
firms’ productivity is not necessarily related positively to their employment; however, 
from the empirical point of view, the productivity (TFP) usually has a positive correlation 
with the total employment (see, for example, Fukao and Kwon, 2006).  Thus, the use of 
employment as a proxy for productivity may be plausible to some extent.  As a result, the 
larger the affiliates’ scale, the more likely they would be to utilize an FTA scheme. 
Next, in order to explore Hypothesis 3, we introduce Concentrationi, which captures 
the concentration of sources of intermediate inputs.  Our dataset has the shares of local 
procurement, imports from other ASEAN countries, imports from Japan, imports from 
other Asian countries excluding ASEAN and Japan, imports from the US, imports from 
Europe, and imports from other countries.  The variable Concentrationi is constructed as a 
variance among the above seven shares.  The lower the Concentrationi, the more 
diversified the sources of intermediate inputs. Thus, if the love-of-variety nature of 
intermediate products and the benefits from vertical division of labor reduce affiliates’ 
input costs greatly, the coefficient for Concentrationi would be expected to be 
significantly negative.
8  On the other hand, if the diversified sources of inputs result in a 
remarkable rise in the administrative costs for FTA use, its coefficient may be estimated 
to be positive. 
So far, we have not taken care of the ROO explicitly.  As mentioned before, for the 
                                                 
8  As mentioned in Section 1, since the change in tariff classification is available as ROO in East Asia, 
firms do not necessarily need to source a significant share of total inputs from local producers.   14
sake of FTA use, affiliates must secure the ROO of their goods.  In order to control the 
extent of restrictiveness of ROO, we introduce both country fixed effects and sector fixed 
effects because the ROO differs according not only to FTAs but also to sectors.  Several 
other elements are also controlled by such fixed effects, such as differences in wages 
among countries, which affect firms’ operating profits.  The differences in efficiency in 
obtaining the COO among countries are also captured by the estimates of the fixed effects. 
Moreover, those may include the differences in general tariff rates among sectors. 
 
 
5.    Empirical Results 
 
In this section, we report the results of our empirical analyses.  Basic statistics are 
provided in Table 4, and our probit results are presented in Table 5.  The column (I) in 
Table 5 shows our baseline result (marginal effects), which is basically consistent with 
our expectations. 
 
Table 4.   Basic Statistics 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
FTA  872   0.282   0.450   0  1 
Scale  872   5.349   1.426   1.099   11.608  
Concentration  872   0.060   0.028   0.007   0.109  
ExASEAN  872   0.129   0.206   0  1 
ExCHINA  872   0.032   0.103   0  1 









Table 5. Probit Results 
   (I)  (II) 
Scale 0.056***  0.169*** 
[0.013] [0.040] 
Concentration -2.309***  -7.420*** 
[0.610] [1.942] 
ExASEAN 0.195**  0.632** 
[0.080] [0.251] 
ExCHINA 0.324**  1.018** 
[0.139] [0.437] 
ExJAPAN 0.111*  0.384** 
   [0.056]  [0.178] 
Year Dummy  YES  YES 
Sector Dummy  YES  YES 
Country Dummy  YES  YES 
Observations  872   494  
Log Pseudo-likelihood  -296   -449 
Pseudo R2  0.1343   0.1311 
Notes:  In this table, the marginal effects of the regressors are reported. ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, 
and 10% significance, respectively.  Figures in parentheses represent the White consistent 
standard error.  In column (II), the sample is restricted to affiliates with positive exports to other 
ASEAN countries or China, affiliates in Singapore and Malaysia with positive exports to Japan, 
and affiliates in Thailand and Indonesia with positive exports to Japan in 2008.  Furthermore, 
we drop affiliates who answered “importers are exempted from tariffs” as “reasons for not 
using FTAs.” 
 
There are three points that are noteworthy.  First, as demonstrated in Demidova and 
Krishna (2008), the coefficient for Scale is estimated to be significantly positive, 
indicating that the larger the affiliate, the more likely it is to utilize an FTA scheme in its 
exporting.  This result is also consistent with that in Takahashi and Urata (2008, 2009). 
Second, the coefficient for Concentration is estimated to be significantly negative, 
showing that benefits from the love-of-variety in inputs, and/or from vertical division of 
labor, exceed the rise in the administrative costs due to the diversity of procurement 
origins.  In particular, it is interesting that firms which are actively engaged in 
international fragmentation are likely to use an FTA scheme in their exporting.  Third, 
coefficients for export shares are all estimated to be positively significant and show an   16
expected order in their magnitude.  The largest magnitude can be found in the coefficient 
for ExCHINA, while the lowest magnitude in that for ExJAPAN.  Thus, affiliates that 
export actively to countries with higher general tariffs are more likely to use FTAs.  This 
result is consistent with what Kohpaiboon (2008) confirmed at the sector level. 
The results of fixed effects in the estimation of column (I) might be worth reporting 
particularly for policy makers.  Column (I) in Table 6 reports the results of country fixed 
effects.  We find that affiliates in the Philippines and Vietnam are less likely to utilize FTA 
schemes, while the most active use of FTA is found in affiliates in Singapore.  Due to the 
fact that Singapore provides the most efficient procedures for obtaining the COO, these 
results might suggest that such procedures in the Philippines and Vietnam are more 
cumbersome than those in other ASEAN countries.
9  The results of sector fixed effects 
are reported in column (I) in Table 7.  From this table, we can see that FTAs are less likely 
to be utilized in electric parts and components and precision machinery.  This result is 
most likely due to the low general tariff rates in those sectors.  Indeed, the general tariff 
rates for most IT products are low or zero under the Information Technology Agreement 
(ITA). 
 
Table 6.  Results of Country Dummy: Thailand as a Base 
   (I)     (II) 
Coef. Robust  Coef.  Robust 
S.E. S.E. 
Malaysia 0.052  [0.145]      0.114  [0.174] 
Singapore 0.490**  [0.193]  0.314  [0.221] 
Indonesia 0.026  [0.161]  0.15  [0.202] 
Philippines -0.548***  [0.160] -0.396*  [0.220] 
Vietnam -0.670***  [0.255]      -0.329  [0.341] 
Note:  ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively.  
                                                 
9  Also, this may reflect only the availability of FTA schemes for affiliates.  Indeed, Singapore has 
concluded the largest number of FTAs among ASEAN countries, while there are relatively few FTAs 




Table 7.  Results of Sector Dummy:  Food Sector as a Base 
   (I)     (II) 
Coef. Robust  Coef.  Robust 
S.E. S.E. 
Wearing apparel  0.641  [0.440]     0.875  [0.605] 
Wood products  0.125  [0.470]  0.101  [0.529] 
Furniture -0.954  [0.626] 
Paper products  -0.308  [0.563]  0.318  [0.788] 
Chemicals -0.17  [0.285]  0.108  [0.313] 
Petroleum products  0.575  [0.556]  1.090*  [0.635] 
Plastic products  -0.462  [0.306]  -0.192  [0.344] 
Rubber products  -0.232  [0.347]  -0.058  [0.397] 
Glass and glass products  -0.303  [0.376]  -0.312  [0.419] 
Basic iron and steel  -0.337  [0.344]  0.073  [0.382] 
Non-ferrous metals  -0.139  [0.326]  0.381  [0.385] 
Metal products  -0.369  [0.290]  -0.005  [0.329] 
General machinery  -0.368  [0.342]  0.001  [0.394] 
Electric machinery  -0.363  [0.278]  -0.092  [0.311] 
Electric parts  -0.938***  [0.297]  -0.681**  [0.332] 
Automobile 0.646  [0.425]  1.177**  [0.541] 
Automobile parts  0.314  [0.276]  0.718**  [0.317] 
Precision machinery  -0.889*  [0.524]  -0.753  [0.569] 
Others -0.459*  [0.271]      -0.151  [0.302] 
Note:  ***, **, and * show 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively.  
 
We conduct one important robustness check.  As mentioned before, affiliates should 
be excluded if they do not export to countries that conclude FTAs with their host countries. 
Here, we again pay attention only to three kinds of FTAs; AFTA, ASEAN-China FTA, 
and bilateral FTAs with Japan.  Specifically, we restrict our sample only to affiliates with 
positive exports to other ASEAN countries or China.  Furthermore, affiliates in Singapore 
and Malaysia are also included if they export to Japan.  Affiliates in Thailand and 
Indonesia are not excluded if they have positive exports to Japan in 2008.
10  We further 
                                                 
10  The reason for not using FTAs/EPAs, “there are no FTAs/EPAs with the countries to which we 
export”, is available only in 2008.  Since, unlike Section 2, our sample years include 2006 and 2007, 
we cannot use this information for restricting our sample to affiliates exporting to countries with FTAs 
with their host countries.   18
take care of investment incentive schemes.  As mentioned in Section 2, the major reason 
for not utilizing FTAs in ASEAN is that “importers are exempted from tariffs” (37.6%).  
If affiliates’ trading partners enjoy investment incentive schemes, such affiliates do not 
need to use FTAs in their exporting.  Thus, such affiliates are dropped from our sample for 
the analysis of the exporters’ choice of FTA use.  To this end, we use the data item on 
“reasons for not using FTAs,” and we drop affiliates that answered “tariffs are exempted 
in the importer side” for that item. 
The result is reported in column (II).  From Table 5, we can see that the results on our 
hypotheses remain unchanged.  The results of fixed effects are reported in the 
corresponding columns in Tables 6 and 7.  Two points are noteworthy here.  First, there is 
the robust result that affiliates in the Philippines are less likely to use an FTA scheme. 
Second, coefficients for automobile sectors turn out to be significant.  This change may 
indicate that active use of investment incentive schemes in ASEAN leads to the 
underestimation of the fixed effect’s estimate in those sectors. 
 
 
6.    Concluding Remarks 
 
It is noted that utilization of AFTA is low by international standards.  In order to 
clarify the reasons for such low utilization, this paper investigates what kinds of Japanese 
affiliates in ASEAN are more likely to use FTAs in their exporting.  For this purpose, we 
employ a unique dataset from a survey of Japanese affiliates operating in Asia conducted 
by the Japan External Trade Organization.  Our findings are as follow.  First, the larger the 




utilize an FTA scheme in its exporting.  Second, affiliates that export actively to countries 
with higher general tariffs are more likely to use FTAs.  Third, there are clear differences 
in FTA utilization depending affiliates’ locations and sectors. 
These results suggest some reasons why FTA utilization in East Asia is low by 
international standards.  The first reason is the active use of investment incentive schemes 
in ASEAN.  Enjoying such schemes, firms do not need to use FTA schemes in order to 
trade at zero tariff rates.  The second is the fact that the major trade in ASEAN is in the 
electrical machinery industry, in which general tariff rates are already low.  According to 
the World Trade Atlas database, in our six ASEAN countries, the share of electrical 
machinery exports to the world in total exports was near 30% during 2006-2008.  Almost 
the same share can also be observed in the case of imports.  The last reason is the 
existence of fixed costs, for example the administrative costs due to the cumbersome 
procedures for obtaining a COO.  The significant results in Scale and Concentration 
imply the existence of a certain level of such fixed costs.  If fixed costs are high in 
ASEAN compared to other regions, this would constitute a reason for low utilization of 
FTAs. 
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